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Abstract: 
The aim of illocutionary logic is to explain how context can affect the meaning of 
certain special kinds of performative utterances. Recall that performative utterances 
are understood as follows: a speaker performs the illocutionary act (e.g. act of 
assertion, of conjecture, of promise) with the illocutionary force (resp. assertion, 
conjecture, promise) named by an appropriate performative verb in the way of 
representing himself as performing that act. In the paper I proposed many-valued 
interpretation of illocutionary forces understood as modal operators. As a result, I built 
up a non-Archimedean valued logic for formalizing illocutionary acts. A formal many-
valued approach to illocutionary logic was offered for the first time. 
 
1. A non-Fregean formal analysis of illocutionary acts 
Conventional logics including the most non-classical logics like fuzzy 
logics, paraconsistent logics, etc. satisfy the so-called Fregean approach 
according to that the meaning of a well-formed expression (for instance, 
the meaning of a propositional formula) should depend on meanings of its 
components (respectively, on meanings of propositional variables), i.e. the 
meaning of a composite expression should be a function defined 
inductively on meanings of atoms. This feature distinguishes the most 
formal languages from the natural one. In the speech living practice we 
could exemplify a lot that the meaning of a composite speech act may be 
not a function defined inductively on meanings of elementary speech acts 
included in that composite expression. This means that a logic of speech 
acts cannot satisfy the Fregean approach in general. 
Now let us consider the structure of speech acts and their compositions. 
We are trying to show how compositions in natural language (i.e. in speech 
acts) differ from compositions defined inductively within the conventional 
formal logic. Speech acts from the logical point of view are said to be 
illocutionary acts. We know that whenever a speaker utters a sentence in 
an appropriate context with certain intentions, he performs one or more 
illocutionary acts. We will denote the simple illocutionary act by F(Φ). 
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This denoting means that each simple illocutionary act can be regarded as 
one consisting of an illocutionary force F and a propositional content Φ. 
For example, the utterance “I promise you (F) to come (Φ)” has such a 
structure. Usually, the illocutionary force is expressed by performative 
sentences which consist of a performative verb used in the first or third 
person present tense of the indicative mood with an appropriate 
complement clause. In our case we used the example of illocutionary act 
with the performative verb “promise.” However, the illocutionary force is 
not totally reduced to an appropriate performative verb. It also indicates 
moods of performance (e.g., moods of order are distinguished in the 
following two sentences: “Will you leave the room?”, “If only you would 
leave the room”). Notice that an illocutionary force of performative verb 
can be expressed nonverbally too, e.g. by means of intonations or gestures. 
Traditionally, the illocutionary force is classified into five groups that are 
called illocutionary points: assertives, commissives, directives, 
declaratives, expressives.1 
The illocutionary points are used in the setting of simple illocutionary acts. 
When a simple illocutionary act is successfully and non-defectively 
performed there will always be effects produced in the hearer, the effect of 
understanding the utterance and an appropriate perlocutionary effect (for 
instance, the further effect on the feeling, attitude, and subsequent behavior 
of the hearer). Thus, an illocutionary act must be both successful and non-
defective. Recall that in classical logic a well-formed proposition is 
evaluated as either true or false and in conventional logics as a degree of 
truth (the latter could be however very different, e.g. it could run the unit 
interval [0, 1] as in fuzzy logics, trees of some data as in spatial logics and 
behavior logics, sets of truth values as in higher-order fuzzy logics and 
some paraconsistent logics, etc.). But as we see, a non-defective simple 
illocutionary act is evaluated as either successful or unsuccessful in the 
given context of utterance (notice that within the more detailed 
consideration in the same way as in non-classical logics, the meaning of 
non-defective simple illocutionary act could be evaluated as a degree of 
successfulness). 
                                                            
1  In short, they are distinguished as follows: “One can say how things are (assertives),  one can try to get other people to do things 
(directives), one can commit oneself to doing  things (commissives), one can bring about changes in the world through one’s utterances 
(declarations), and one can express one’s feelings and attitudes (expressives)” (Searle and Vanderveken 1984: 52). 
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Regarding compositions in speeches, i.e. appropriate composite 
illocutionary acts built up from simple ones, we could distinguish two 
cases: first, the case of compositions that satisfy the Fregean approach and, 
second, the case of compositions that break the latter. The criterion will be 
as follows. If a logical superposition of simple illocutionary acts may be 
also evaluated as either successful or unsuccessful, it is said to be a 
complex illocutionary act. In this case we have no composition defined 
inductively. If it may be examined as either true or false, then this logical 
superposition is said to be an illocutionary sentence. In this case we can 
follow the Fregean approach.  
Logical connectives (∨, ∧, ⇒, ¬) which we use in the building of complex 
acts or sentences we will call illocutionary connectives. They differ from 
usual ones. As an example, the illocutionary disjunction in the utterance “I 
order to leave the room or I order to not leave the room” differs from the 
usual propositional disjunction, because it doesn’t express here the law of 
excluded middle and a hearer can reject it as an unsuccessful illocutionary 
act. 
Sometimes a logical superposition of simple illocutionary acts with 
propositions also sets a complex illocutionary act. Some examples are as 
follows: “If it rains, I promise you I’ll take my umbrella” (the illocutionary 
implication of the form Ψ ⇒ F(Φ)), “It rains and I assert that I’ll take my 
umbrella” (the illocutionary conjunction of the form Ψ ∧ F(Φ)). But we 
can consider cases when a logical superposition of simple illocutionary 
acts with propositions doesn’t get a complex illocutionary act. As an 
example, “If I think so, then really it is so” (the illocutionary implication of 
the form F(Φ) ⇒ Φ). Indeed, it is a true illocutionary sentence. 
Thus, I distinguish illocutionary sentences from illocutionary acts. Just as 
illocutionary acts express appropriate performances, so illocutionary 
sentences say about logical properties of illocutionary acts. Existence of 
illocutionary sentences (i.e. some inductive compositions in composite 
speeches) allows us to set a special logic that is called illocutionary logic. 
It studies logical and semantic properties of illocutionary acts and 
illocutionary sentences. Therefore “just as propositional logic studies the 
properties of all truth functions …, so illocutionary logic studies the 
properties of illocutionary forces without worrying about the various ways 
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that these are realized in the syntax of English” (Searle and Vanderveken 
1984). Illocutionary logic plays an important role in modern analytical 
philosophy of language and in logical models of speech acts: its aim is to 
explain how context can affect the meaning of certain special kinds of 
illocutionary acts. The first formalization of illocutionary logic was created 
by J.R. Searle and D. Vanderveken (1984). In that work, a semantic-
phenomenological approach was proposed and in the framework of this 
approach all the conditions of success and non-defection of illocutionary 
acts were precisely investigated. 
In this paper I propose a logical-syntactic approach to illocutionary logic, 
according to that I consider illocutionary forces as modal operators which 
have a many-valued interpretation. This approach can supplement the 
approach of J.R. Searle and D. Vanderveken. 
 
2. A many-valued illocutionary logic with the only performative verb 
“think” 
In order to show how we could set up compositions in illocutionary logic 
and combine Fregean and non-Fregean compositions within a logical 
system in general, we first try to define a propositional logic with the only 
performative verb “think.” Let us consider a propositional language L that 
is built in the standard way with the additional unary operator F. It is called 
the illocutionary force of the performative verb “think.” We will say that 
the illocutionary act F(Φ) is a performance of a proposition Φ. From the 
point of view of social constructivism (Berger 1971), the content of social 
acts and the content of performances of any propositions are not physical 
facts. Therefore performances cannot be evaluated as either true or false. 
The performance of Φ that we obtain by using the performative verb 
“think” can be either successful or unsuccessful. It is successful if F(Φ) 
represents a true propositional content of Φ (i.e., if Φ is true) and it is not 
successful if F(Φ) represents a false propositional content of Φ (i.e., if Φ is 
false). The success and unsuccess of performance will be denoted by 1/2 
and −1/2 respectively. 
Further, let us suppose that atomic propositions, i.e. propositional 
variables, (they belong to the set VarL := {p, p1, p2, …}) can have only one 
of the following two truth values: 1 (“true”) and 0 (“false”). Let our 
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language L be associated with the following matrix M = <{1, 1/2 , 0,−1/2}, 
{1}, ¬, F, ⇒, ∨, ∧ >, where  
• {1, 1/2 , 0,−1/2} is the set of truth values 
• {1} is the singleton of designated truth values, 
• ¬, F are unary operations for negation and illocutionary force 
respectively, both are defined as follows: 
 
¬x = ቊ1 െ ݔ ݂݅ ݔ א
ሼ1, 0ሽ,
െݔ ݂݅ ݔ א ቄଵ
ଶ
, െ ଵ
ଶ
ቅ ;
 
 
F(x)=ቐ
ݔ െ ଵ
ଶ
 ݂݅ ݔ א ሼ1, 0ሽ,
ݔ ݂݅ ݔ א ቄଵ
ଶ
, െ ଵ
ଶ
ቅ .
 
 
• ⇒, ∨, ∧ are binary operations for disjunction, conjunction, and 
implication respectively, their definitions: 
 
x ⇒ y = 1 – sup(x, y)  + y =  
ە
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۓ 1   ݂݅     ݔ ൑ ݕ,
ݕ   ݂݅  ݔ ൐ ݕ   ܽ݊݀  ݔ ൌ 1,
ଵ
ଶ
  ݂݅ ݔ ൐ ݕ ܽ݊݀ ݔ ൌ 0 ݋ݎ ݕ ൌ 0,
0     ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁;
 
 
x ∨ y = ቊinfሺݔ, ݕሻ ݂݅ ݔ, ݕ א ቄ
ଵ
ଶ
, െ ଵ
ଶ
ቅ ,
supሺݔ, ݕሻ  ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁;
 
 
x ∧ y = ቊsupሺݔ, ݕሻ ݂݅ ݔ, ݕ א ቄ
ଵ
ଶ
, െ ଵ
ଶ
ቅ ,
infሺݔ, ݕሻ  ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁.
 
 
Then it could easily be proved that the unary operator F satisfies the 
following conditions: 
 
∀a ∈ M. a ≥ F(a),      (1) 
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∀a ∈ M. ¬a ≥ ¬F(a),      (2) 
 
∀a, b ∈ M. (F(a) ∧ F(b)) ≥ F(a ∧ b),   (3) 
 
∀a, b ∈ M. (F(a) ∨ F(b)) ≤ F(a ∨ b),   (4) 
 
∀a, b ∈ M. (F(a) ⇒ F(b)) ≥ F(a ⇒ b),   (5) 
 
∀a ∈ M. F(F(a)) = F(a),     (6) 
 
∀a ∈ M. ¬F(a) = F(¬a).     (7) 
 
Let e be a valuation of atomic propositions, i.e. e: VarL → {0, 1}. We can 
extend e to the case of the following valuation Ve : L → {1, 0, 1/2, −1/2} 
by using the operations of M which are assigned to appropriate logical 
connectives. The valuation Ve is called an illocutionary valuation. 
Let Φ ∈ L. The performance of Φ, i.e. F(Φ), is called an unsuccessful for e 
if Ve(F(Φ)) = −1/2 , i.e. Ve(Φ) ∈ {0, −1/2}. The formula F(Φ) is called a 
successful performance for e if Ve(F(Φ)) = 1/2 , i.e. Ve(Φ)∈ {1, 1/2}. 
Further, the formula Φ is called a true sentence for e if Ve(Φ) = 1 and a 
false sentence for e if Ve(Φ) = 0. 
Notice that the element a ∧ ¬a is not a minimal in M, because a ∧ ¬a ≥ F(a 
∧ ¬a) and (F(a) ∧ ¬F(a)) ≥ F(a ∧ ¬a). Consequently, the minimal element 
of M (that is called ‘illocutionary contradiction’ or ‘unsuccess of 
performance’) is assigned to a sentence of the form F(Φ ∧ ¬Φ) when 
somebody thinks a propositional contradiction. 
Let us show that the illocutionary valuation defined above satisfies the 
informal understanding of the concept ‘illocutionary act.’ First of all, we 
should notice that the illocutionary force of “think” sets up a warp of the 
logical space of propositional relations (by analogy with the gravitational 
force which warps the physical space). For instance, suppose that there are 
two successful illocutionary acts: “I think that if it is harmful for my 
health, then I will not do it” and “I think that smoking is harmful for my 
health.” Both don’t imply that the illocutionary act “I think that I will not 
smoke” is successful. However, we could entail according to modus 
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ponens if the illocutionary force of the verb “think” was removed in both 
expressions. So, we can claim that the illocutionary force may be 
considered in terms of the warpage of logical space in the same way as the 
gravitational force has been regarded recently in terms of the warpage of 
Euclidean space.  
This feature is illustrated by inequalities (1) – (7) that could be converted 
to equalities if we removed the illocutionary force F. Namely, inequality 
(1) means that the implication F(Φ) ⇒ Φ is a true sentence of illocutionary 
logic. For example, “If I think that he is God, then he is God” (but not vice 
versa) is an example of illocutionary tautology. Formula (2) means that the 
implication ¬F(Φ) ⇒ ¬Φ is also a true illocutionary sentence. Indeed, 
something exists if I think so and something doesn’t exist if I don’t think 
so. Inequality (3) means that the implication F(Φ ∧ Ψ) ⇒ (F(Φ) ∧ F(Ψ)) is 
a tautology of illocutionary logic. For instance, the following illocutionary 
sentence is true: “If she thinks that the weather is good and the world is 
fine, then she thinks that the weather is good and she thinks that the world 
is fine” (but not vice versa). Continuing in the same way, we can see that 
formulas (4) – (6) satisfy an intuitive meaning, too. Notice that the verb 
“think” readily differ from others within formula (7). The illocutionary act 
“I think that it is not white” is equivalent to “I don’t think that it is white.” 
In the meantime, an illocutionary act with the negation of an illocutionary 
force that we obtain using other performative verbs can differ from the 
same illocutionary act with a positive illocutionary force, but with the 
negative propositional content. An example of illocutionary negation: “I do 
not promise to come”, an example of an illocutionary act with a negative 
propositional content: “I promise not to come.” As we see, these acts are 
different. 
I have just exemplified how we can combine Fregean and non-Fregean 
compositions of simple illocutionary acts within a logical system. I have 
done this by distinguishing composite expressions evaluated as 0 and 1 
from composite expressions evaluated as 1/2 and –1/2. The first 
expressions correspond to the Fregean approach (when the meaning of the 
whole is reduced to its components), the second ones evidently do not 
(because they assume to be ordered by the dual relation, where conjunction 
is understood as supremum and disjunction as infimum; as a result, the 
meaning of composite expression changes meanings of components: 
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conjunction of components starts to be interpreted as disjunction on the 
level of the whole expression and vice versa). Taking into account that we 
had postulated the existence of the only performative verb, we defined 
illocutionary logical operations by induction. In this meaning, we built up a 
many-valued illocutionary logic of Frege’s style and did our best to present 
both Fregean and non-Fregean compositions within conventional logic. 
However, it was just an illustration in the simplest case of using the only 
performative verb. This exemplification allowed us to clarify that non-
Fregean compositions in speech acts can be regarded logically too, by a 
kind of dualization, when meanings start to be ordered by the dual relation. 
 
3. An ordering relation on the set of all illocutionary forces 
Now set up the more complicated problem to construct a many-valued 
illocutionary logic closed under the class of all performative verbs. We can 
be sure that in this case our logic will not be of Frege’s style. In the 
beginning, we should define a partial ordering relation ≤ on an infinite 
class of all illocutionary forces (expressed by all performative verbs). This 
allows us to define the basic logical connectives (∨, ∧, ⇒, ¬) on the set of 
simple illocutionary acts. Intuitively, the relation Ve(F1(Φ)) ≤ Ve(F2(Ψ)), 
where Ve is supposed to be an evaluation function run over well-formed 
formulas (however, it is not defined yet), holds if and only if an 
illocutionary act F1(Φ) logically entails an illocutionary act F2(Ψ). In the 
latter case it is not possible to perform the first act without thereby 
performing the second (i.e. for all contexts of utterances i ∈ I, if F1(Φ) is 
performed at i, then F2(Ψ) is performed at i, too). 
A new ordering relation also provides us with a possibility to consider so-
called disjoint or opposite illocutionary acts F1(Φ), F2(Φ). Both are 
disjoint/opposite when F1(Φ) ∧ F2(Φ) is not simultaneously performable, 
more precisely when the successful performance of F1(Φ) is relatively 
inconsistent (1) with the achievement of the illocutionary point of F2 on Φ, 
or (2) with the degrees of strength of illocutionary point of F2, or (3) with 
the satisfaction by Φ of the propositional content conditions of F2, or (4) 
with the presupposition of the preparatory conditions of F2(Φ), or finally 
(5) with a commitment to the psychological state of F2(Φ). 
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In the next section, we are trying to examine general properties of opposite 
illocutionary acts. 
 
4. A square of opposition for illocutionary acts 
First, assume that two illocutionary forces F1 and F2 are stand in the 
semantical opposition. This means that they cannot at the same time both 
be successful, however both may be unsuccessful. In other words, an 
illocutionary act F1(Φ) is semantically equivalent to an illocutionary act 
F2(¬Φ) (clearly, in this case F2(Φ) is semantically equivalent to F1(¬Φ)), 
i.e. Ve(F1(Φ)) = Ve(F2(¬Φ)) and Ve(F1(¬Φ)) = Ve(F2(Φ)). For example, 
the performative verbs “order” and “forbid” have such opposition. The 
square of opposition or logical square for illocutionary acts is a natural 
way of classifying illocutionary forces which are relevant to a given 
opposition. Starting from two illocutionary forces F1 and F2 that are 
contraries, the square of opposition entails the existence of two other 
illocutionary forces, namely ¬F1 and ¬F2. As a result, we obtain the 
following four distinct kinds of opposition between pairs of illocutionary 
acts: 
 
  F1(Φ)   F2(Φ) 
 
 
 
 
¬F2(Φ)   ¬F1(Φ) 
 
Figure 1. The square of oppositions for illocutionary forces F1, F2. For 
instance, F1 is “bless” and F2 is “damn.” There can be an infinite number 
of such squares for different illocutionary forces. At least, there exists an 
appropriate square of opposition for each illocutionary force. In the latter 
case F1 is “bless to do” and F2 is “bless not to do.” 
10 
 
 
• Firstly, illocutionary forces F1 and F2 are contrary. This means that 
they cannot be successful together in corresponding illocutionary 
acts F1(Φ) and F2(Φ) with the same propositional content, but as we 
see both may be unsuccessful: “I insist that he takes part” and “I 
insist that he doesn’t take part.” A speaker cannot successfully 
simultaneously say: “I order you to leave the room” and “I forbid 
you to leave the room.” 
• Secondly, illocutionary forces F1 and ¬F1 (resp. F2 and ¬F2) are 
contradictory, i.e. the success of one implies the unsuccess of the 
other, and conversely. For instance, the success of the illocutionary 
act “I order you to do this” implies the unsuccess of the 
corresponding act “I request that you do not do it,” and conversely.  
• Next, illocutionary forces ¬F1 and ¬F2 are subcontrary, i.e. it is 
impossible for both to be unsuccessful in corresponding illocutionary 
acts ¬F1(Φ) and ¬F2(Φ) with the same propositional content, 
however it is possible both to be successful. 
• Lastly, illocutionary forces F1 and ¬F2 (resp. F2 and ¬F1) are said to 
stand in the subalternation, i.e. the success of the first (“the 
superaltern”) implies the success of the second (“the subaltern”), but 
not conversely. As an example, the success of the illocutionary act 
“he orders” implies the success of the illocutionary act “he requests”, 
but not vice versa. Consequently, the success of an illocutionary act 
F1(Φ) or F2(Φ) implies the success of the corresponding illocutionary 
act ¬F2(Φ) or ¬F2(Φ), respectively. Consequently, the unsuccess of 
an illocutionary act ¬F2(Φ) or ¬F2(Φ) implies the unsuccess of the 
corresponding illocutionary act F1(Φ) or F2(Φ), respectively. 
Thus, pairs of illocutionary acts are called contradictories (contradictoriae) 
when they cannot at the same time both be successful or both be 
unsuccessful, contraries (contrariae) when both cannot at the same time be 
successful, subcontraries (subcontrariae) when both cannot at the same 
time be unsuccessful, and subalternates (subalternae) when the success of 
the one act implies the success of the other, but not conversely. 
There is a very easy way to detect whether the square of opposition for the 
given illocutionary acts holds. The expected criterion is as follows: if 
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F(¬Φ) ⇒ ¬F(Φ) is a true illocutionary sentence, i.e. Ve(F(¬Φ)) ≤ 
Ve(¬F(Φ)), then the square of opposition for illocutionary acts holds. As a 
corollary, the following expressions are to be regarded as true illocutionary 
sentences: 
 
¬F(¬Φ) ∨ ¬F(Φ) – tertium non datur,   (8) 
 
¬(F(¬Φ) ∧ F(Φ)) – the law of contrary.   (9) 
 
5. A non-Archimedean interpretation of illocutionary forces 
Now we are trying to develop a formal approach to evaluations of 
illocutionary forces due to non-Archimedean semantics proposed by 
Schumann (2008) and Schumann (2009). Suppose B is a complete Boolean 
algebra with the bootom element 0 and the top element 1 such that the 
cardinality of its domain |B| is an infinite number. Build up the set BB of all 
functions  f : B → B. The set of all complements for finite subsets of B is a 
filter and it is called a Frechet filter, it is denoted by U. Further, define a 
new relation ≈ on the set BB by f ≈ g = {a ∈ B : f(a) = g(a)} ∈ U. It is 
easily be proved that the relation ≈ is an equivalence. For each f ∈ BB let 
[f] denote the equivalence class of f under ≈. The ultrapower BB/U is then 
defined to be the set of all equivalence classes [f] as f ranges over BB. This 
ultrapower is called a nonstandard (or non-Archimedean) extension of B, 
for more details see Robinson (1966) and Schumann (2008). It is denoted 
by *B. 
There exist two groups of members of *B: (1) functions that are constant, 
e.g. f(a) = m ∈ B on the set U, a constant function [f = m] is denoted by 
*m, (2) functions that aren’t constant. The set of all constant functions of 
*B is called standard set and it is denoted by °B. The members of °B are 
called standard. It is readily seen that B and °B are isomorphic.  
We can extend the usual partial order structure on B to a partial order 
structure on °B: 
• for any members x, y ∈ B we have x ≤ y in B iff  *x ≤ *y in °B,  
• each member *x ∈ °B (which possibly is a bottom element *0 of °B) 
is greater than any number [f] ∈ *B\°B, i.e. *x > [f] for any x ∈ B, 
where [f] isn’t constant function. 
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Notice that under these conditions, there exist the top element *1 ∈ *B 
such that 1 ∈ B, but the element *0 ∈ *B such that 0 ∈ B is not bottom for 
*B.  
The ordering conditions mentioned above have the following informal 
sense: (1) the sets °B and B have isomorphic order structure; (2) the set *B 
contains actual infinities that are less than any member of °B. These 
members are called Boolean infinitesimals.  
Introduce three operations ‘sup’, ‘inf’, ‘¬’ in the partial order structure of 
*B: 
 
inf([f], [g]) = [inf(f, g)]; 
 
sup([f], [g]) = [sup(f, g)]; 
 
¬[f] = [¬f]. 
 
This means that a nonstandard extension *B of a Boolean algebra B 
preserves the least upper bound ‘sup’, the greatest lower bound ‘inf’, and 
the complement ‘¬’ of B. 
Consider the member [h] of *B such that {a ∈ B: h(a) = f(¬a)} ∈ U. 
Denote [h] by [f¬]. Then we see that inf([f], [f¬]) ≥ *0 and sup([f], [f¬])  
≤ *1. Really, we have three cases. 
• Case 1. The members ¬[f] and [f¬] are incompatible. Then inf([f], 
[f¬]) ≥ *0 and sup([f], [f¬])  ≤ *1, 
• Case 2. Suppose ¬[f] ≥ [f¬]. In this case inf([f], [f¬]) = *0 And 
sup([f], [f¬]) ≤ *1. 
• Case 3. Suppose ¬[f] ≤ [f¬]. In this case inf([f], [f¬]) ≥ *0 And 
sup([f], [f¬]) = *1. 
Now define hyperrational valued matrix logic MB as the ordered system 
<*B, {*1}, ¬, ⇒, ∨, ∧>, where  
• *B is the set of truth values, 
• {*1} is the set of designated truth values,  
• for all [x] ∈ *B, ¬[x] = *1 – [x],  
• for all [x], [y] ∈ *B, [x] ⇒ [y] = *1 − sup([x], [y]) + [y],  
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• for all *x, *y ∈ °B, *x ∨ *y = sup(*x, *y),  
• for all *x, *y ∈ °B, x ∧ y = inf(*x, *y). 
• for all [x], [y] ∈ *B\°B, [x] ∨ [y] = inf([x], [y]),  
• for all [x], [y] ∈ *B\°B, [x] ∧ [y] = sup([x], [y]). 
 
 
[f]    [f¬] 
 
 
 
 
¬[f¬]   ¬[f] 
 
Figure 2. In case [f¬] ≤ ¬[f], the square of oppositions for any members 
[f], [f¬], ¬[f¬], ¬[f] of *B holds true, i.e. [f], [f¬] are contrary, [f], ¬[f] 
(resp. ¬[f¬], ¬[f]) are contradictory, ¬[f¬], ¬[f] are subcontrary, [f], 
¬[f¬] (resp. [f¬],  ¬[f]) are said to stand in the subalternation . 
 
Let us consider a propositional language LB that is built in the standard 
way with the additional set of unary operators F1, F2, F3, ... We suppose 
that for each performative verb, this set contains an appropriate sign. So, 
this set should be uncountable infinite. We associate the language LB with 
the matrix MB in accordance with the illocutionary evaluation Ve satisfying 
the following properties: 
• Ve(F(Ψ)) = [f] ∈ *B\°B if Ψ does not contain unary operators F1, F2, 
F3, ...; 
• Ve(Fi(Fj(Ψ))) = ([f]i ⇒ Ve(Fj(Ψ))), where [f]i ∈ *B\°B and ⇒ is an 
operation of MB.;  
• Ve(Ψ) = *x ∈ °B if Ψ does not contain unary operators F1, F2, F3, ...; 
• Ve(Φ ∧ Ψ) = (Ve(Φ) ∧ Ve(Ψ)), where on the right-side ∧ is an 
operation of MB; 
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• Ve(Φ ∨ Ψ) = (Ve(Φ) ∨ Ve(Ψ)), where on the right-side ∨ is an 
operation of MB; 
• Ve(Φ ⇒ Ψ) = (Ve(Φ) ⇒ Ve(Ψ)), where on the right-side ⇒ is an 
operation of MB. 
It can easily be proved that the following formulas are illocutionary 
tautologies according to the matrix MB in the same measure as they were in 
the matrix M (see section 2): 
 
F(Φ) ⇒ Φ,     (10) 
 
¬F(Φ) ⇒ ¬Φ,     (11) 
 
F(Φ ∧ Ψ) ⇒ (F(Φ) ∧ F(Ψ)),   (12) 
 
(F(Φ) ∨ F(Ψ)) ⇒ F(Φ ∨ Ψ),   (13) 
 
F(Φ ⇒ Ψ) ⇒ (F(Φ) ⇒ F(Ψ)),  (14) 
 
Instead of formula (7), the matrix MB satisfies the relations of square of 
oppositions for illocutionary acts. Formula (6) does not hold in general, 
too, because each illocutionary force effects in a unique way. For instance, 
a cyclic self-denying illocutionary act “I promise I will not keep this 
promise” F(¬F(F(¬F(…)))) is evaluated as follows: 
Ve(F(¬F(F(¬F(…))))) = ([f] ⇒ (¬[f] ⇒ ([f] ⇒ (¬[f] ⇒ (…))))). As we 
see, a cyclic self-denying illocutionary act does not correspond to any 
member of *B. The matter is that we have there an infinite sequence ([f] ⇒ 
(¬[f] ⇒ ([f] ⇒ (¬[f] ⇒ (…))))) whose whole truth-value depends on a 
truth-value of the most right atomic formula, but the sequence is infinite 
and we have no end-right atomic formula.  
The novel logic is not Fregean, though it is evidently formal and 
furthermore it can be shown that some restrictions of this logic may be 
complete (Schumann 2008). The point is that we obtain an uncountable 
infinite set of well-formed formulas for that there is no induction in general 
(it depends on the non-Archimedean structure of this set). 
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6. Conclusion 
In the paper I have proposed a many-valued calculus in that illocutionary 
forces and performances are considered as modal operators of a special 
kind. As a result, I have constructed an easier formalization of 
illocutionary act theory than usual ones. This formalization could be 
applied in model-theoretic semantics of natural language and natural 
language programming. 
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